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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT 
Defendants Miles Walter Langley and Robert P. Thorpe are listed as defendants in 
this lawsuit, but neither is a party to this appeal. 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant/Appellee Ranger Insurance Company ("Ranger") agrees with the 
Jurisdictional Statement in Appellants George Lee and Gerald Lee's ("the Lees") 
Appellate Brief. 
II. ISSUES PRESERVED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATIONS OF ISSUES BELOW 
The Lees present five issues on appeal, none of which question the jury's verdict. 
They have correctly identified the standard of review this Court should apply to each 
issue. (Appellants' Brief, v-viii). However, the Lees have not shown where each issue 
has been preserved in the record pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
24(a)(5)(A). This is a significant omission, since Ranger contends that the Lees have not 
properly preserved their first and second issues, pertaining to jury instructions. 
Regardless of how the Lees have chosen to frame their issues on appeal, Ranger 
believes the overarching issue for this Court's consideration is as follows: 
Whether the jury's verdict that bail bondsman Miles Langley did not assault or 
recklessly endanger the Lees should be overturned based on alleged errors that had no 
impact on the jury's decision? 
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no statutes or rules that are determinative of any issues on appeal. While 
the Lees claim that Utah Code Ann. §31 A-35-601 (1999), "Acts of [Bail Bond] Agent," 
and §53-11-101, et seq, "Bail Bond Recovery Act," govern this appeal, the trial court 
noted that these statutes apply to sureties and bail recovery agents who are licensed in 
Utah. (R. 1187, p. 6). Since the Lees contend on appeal that Miles Langley was not 
licensed in Utah, these statutes are inapplicable. 
Should this Court conclude that these statutes are determinative of this appeal, 
Ranger points out that Utah Code Ann. §77-20-8.5 (1998) authorizes a surety to arrest a 
fugitive "at any time . . . and at any place within the state" for the purpose of surrendering 
him to the court. (Appellants' Addendum 25). Moreover, the statutes do not prohibit a 
bondsman duly licensed in another state from entering Utah to apprehend a fugitive 
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. 
IV, STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Parties, Course of the Proceedings and Disposition 
Below, 
The Appellants are brothers George and Gerald Lee, two Utah residents who claim 
they were assaulted by a Colorado bail recovery agent, Miles Langley, on April 2, 1999, 
in Vernal, Utah. (R. 2). At the time of the alleged assault, there were two outstanding 
warrants in Colorado for Gerald Lee, one for driving under the influence and one for 
operating a vehicle without a driver's license. (R. 1187, p. 105; R. 999 Exhibit 1, pp. 
001-002). 
Defendant Robert P. Thorpe owned A-l Bail Bonds ("A-l"), a bail bond agency in 
Grand Junction, Colorado. (R. 1187, p. 254; M. Thorpe depo. p. 6).1 Maria Thorpe, his 
*Page 254 of the trial court transcript notes that witness Maria Thorpe's deposition 
transcript was made part of the record. (R. 1187, p. 254). However, it appears that the 
clerk of the trial court did not assign a separate page number for her deposition transcript 
in the record. When citing portions of Ms. Thorpe's deposition transcript in this brief, 
^ 
wife, was also an owner. (R. 1187, p. 254; M. Thorpe depo. pp. 5-6). Shortly after 
Gerald Lee was arrested in Colorado in 1998 for the two separate offenses, he purchased 
two bail bonds from A-1; the purchase of these bonds allowed him to be released from the 
jail in Colorado until his initial criminal court hearings. (R. 1187, p. 106; Exhibit 2, pp. 
008-010). 
Ranger is a bail bond surety insurer in Texas. (R. 1187, pp. 256-58). Ranger 
contracted with A-1, through a general agent known as North American Bail Bond 
Services ("NABBS"), to supply surety bail bonds. (R. 1187, pp. 258-59; R. 999, Exhibit 
2, p. 018). Ranger acted as principal and A-1 as independent contractor. (R. 999, Exhibit 
2; R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo., pp. 51-52). The Bail Bond Underwriting Agreement 
signed by A-1, Ranger and NABBS provides that A-1 is "solely responsible for . . . the 
apprehension,. . . arrest, extradition and/or surrender of errant bond principals 
[fugitives]." (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 020). A-1 also agreed to conduct apprehensions of 
fugitives "properly and lawfully in compliance with all laws, statutes, regulations and 
prudent business practices utilized in the bail bond business." (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 020). 
Miles Langley was a Colorado resident who was licensed as a bail recovery agent 
in Colorado. (R. 1187, pp. 56, 62-63). He was self-employed. (R. 1187, p. 61). Mr. 
Langley claimed A-1 hired him to apprehend Gerald Lee, a claim contested by A-1. (R. 
Ranger has cited to the page of the trial transcript where her deposition transcript is made 
part of the record, then cites to the page of the deposition transcript containing the 
relevant testimony. The cited portions of her deposition testimony are attached as 
Addendum A. 
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1187, p. 74; R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. p. 39). It was undisputed that Mr. Langley 
was never an employee, independent contractor or agent of Ranger. (R. 1187, p. 259). 
The Lees deposed Mr. Langley in connection with this lawsuit, but he died before trial. 
(R. 1187, p. 55). 
The Lees filed a Complaint in the Eighth Judicial District Court in Vernal, Utah, 
against Mr. Langley, Mr. Thorpe in his capacity as owner of A-l, and Ranger in its 
capacity as bond surety. (R. 2; R. 1187, p. 33). The Complaint alleges that on April 2, 
1999, Mr. Langley, acting as an employee of A-l, apprehended Gerald Lee in Vernal, 
Utah, in order to take him to Colorado on the arrest warrants. (R. 2). The apprehension 
occurred at the home of George Lee, and during the apprehension, a scuffle ensued 
between the Lee brothers and Mr. Langley. (R. 3). The Lees allege they sustained 
physical injuries during the fight. (R. 3). The Complaint lists assault and battery, kidnap, 
and reckless endangerment, as the causes of action. (R. 3). The Complaint seeks both 
compensatory and punitive damages. (R. 3). 
This case was tried to a jury in Vernal on February 2-4, 2004, with Judge Lynn 
Payne presiding. (R. 1187). Neither Mr. Thorpe nor Mr. Langley appeared at trial, 
leaving Ranger as the only defendant present. (R. 1187). Although the Lees did not 
plead false imprisonment in their Complaint, Judge Payne permitted them to present this 
claim to the jury, in addition to claims for assault, reckless endangerment and punitive 
damages. (R. 1187). After the Lees presented their case in chief, Judge Payne granted 
Ranger's motion for partial directed verdict, resulting in dismissal of the false 
4 
ir lpi isonment claim,, (R , 1187, pp. 213, 222-23). 
; --jury answered the Special V erdict formbj finding that I" \ li I angle> did not 
Hsisaiill (ii iii(\lless!y mdiiiipn I he 1 ITS M'SIIIIIIIJ1 MI HI III 11 nusr vetrlirl lui Mi I itiij'li \ 
*\ x, and Ranger. (R. 1009-1012). Because the jury tuui:^ .,ii. ^angley did not 
..-
V:
 ->r recklessly endanger the Lees, the other issues appearing later on the Special 
V erdict form became moot ,,,,.. were not answered b) the jiir> (R , 1009 1012) I 'hose 
issues wen: il I I lllin apporhnniMcnl ml hull innoni' ( n nn»i I tv (ien-ild I tv ,III I I"1 In 
Langley; (2) w hether Mr. Langley was acting as an employee of A *, y3) whether Mr. 
I angley was acting within the scope of any authority \ .* * \y Ranger; and (-T: 
whether the Lees sustained any compensatory or punitive' damages. ( I 
! iiMyii^JiJ MQ^CLS. 
1. Ijlerald Lee was Arrested Twice in Colorado in 1998 for 
Criminal Offenses. 
Gerald I ,ee was arrested in Nov ember 1998, in Grand J unction, Coloi ado, for 
F. I-T,. ±i^  was also arrested in Rio Blanco, Colorado, in late 1998, for driving w ithout 
r
 i »f inswi ante '~ ] The warrants for his arrest on both charges are still 
' 2. , i i . i^ee Purchased I i. i o Bail B ci fiii ds fit ci III ii \ 1 in Oi d ei Ill: ci Ill] e 
Released from,. Jail 
'While in jail for these offenses, Mr. Lee purchased two bail bonds from A 1. (R. 
999, Exhibit 2, pp. 016-017). Mr Lee entered into a Bail Bond Application and Contract 
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with A-1. (R. 999, Exhibit 2, pp. 008-010). Ranger was the surety for these bonds, 
meaning that if Mr. Lee failed to appear for court hearings in Colorado and the bonds 
were forfeited, Ranger guaranteed to pay the Colorado court for the forfeiture. (R. 1187, 
p. 258). Ranger did not undertake, in its capacity as surety, to guarantee to the court that 
Mr. Lee would appear for the court hearings.(R. 1187, p. 258). 
Because Mr. Lee purchased these bail bonds, he was released from jail 
immediately. (R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. p. 10; R. 1187, p. 141). More 
specifically, the Colorado court released him into A-lfs custody. (R. 1187, p. 254, M. 
Thorpe depo. p. 12). Mr. Lee was aware that if he failed to show up for court hearings in 
Colorado, it would cause a forfeiture of the bonds. (R. 1187, p. 146). Additionally, his 
failure to appear would cause a warrant for his arrest to issue. (R. 999, Exhibit 1, pp. 
001-002). 
3. Mr. Lee Contractually Agreed that A-1 Could Arrest Him if He 
Failed to Appear for Colorado Court Hearings. 
In exchange for Ranger acting as surety and A-1 acting as bonding agent so that 
Gerald Lee could be released from jail, he promised Ranger and A-1 several things in the 
Bail Bond Application and Contract. (R. 999, Exhibit 2, pp. 008-010). First, he agreed 
that upon his release from jail until his appearance at court hearings, "Ranger shall have 
control and jurisdiction over me . . . and shall have the right to apprehend and surrender 
me to the proper officials at any time " (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 008). He further agreed 
that if he left Colorado or failed to appear for court hearings, "Ranger and/or its Agent 
shall have the right to forthwith apprehend and surrender me in exoneration of my bail 
6 
1 hi i i i d s " (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 008). Thus, if Mr. Lee failed to show up for court 
hearings in Colorado, A 1 had the i ight to apprehend him and return him to jail in 
i IIIOI.HIU III" I I!'1. ' p M\ '", U I \)\ ' \\ ""vl, M lllioipf ilepo \\ I! Il I • . 
Third, he agreed that if he left Colorado and was apprehended b> A-l, he "agi ee[d] 
to voluntarily return to [Colorado], and waive extradition proceedings and hereby 
consent to the application • - .*uoh reasonable force as may be necessary to effect such 
Minn I V {Wi Ishibil " |i n't""!' Ill n .is uinli'.pulHl illn! llii • liausc p;\\v \ I 11 in miglit 
to apprehend Gerald Lee if he left Colorado. (R. 118 1 , p. 263). 
P Ii , I /ee Failed to Appear for Court Hearings in Colorado 
Related to the T" u Offenses. 
(I .. I SI, 
violation for December io, iy?o. v/v. n o / , p. ^JJJ. I IJK X 
Colorado, scheduled a hearing on Mi I .ee's DUI violation for January 25, 1999. (R. 
1187, p. 265) Mr. I ,ee failed to show up for either court hearing. (R. 1187, p. 109 110). 
bail bonds. (R. 1187, p. 146). A-l had the right at this point to apprehend Mi Lee 
because he had violated "not only his bail bond conditions with the court, but he also . 
violated his bail bond application and contract ' (R 118 1 , p 254, M. Thorpe depo. 
p i p > \ ) I l l • • ' • • . • • • . ' . . ' .' • 
2He testified at trial that he 'failed to appear for the hearings because they were 
scheduled on the same day, winch obviously was not true. (R. 1187, pp. 109-110, 145). 
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On December 16, 1998, the Rio Blanco court issued a Notice of Forfeiture, 
addressed to Mr. Lee, A-1 and Ranger, stating that since Mr. Lee failed to show up for his 
court hearing the week before, the bail bond was in danger of being forfeited. (R. 1187, 
p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. pp. 29-30; R. 999, Exhibit 1, pp. 006-007). The court allowed 
A-1 until April 20, 1999, to bring Mr. Lee into court, or else the bond would be forfeited 
and Ranger or A-1 would have to pay the court $500 for Mr. Lee's failure to appear. (R. 
1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo., pp. 30-32).3 
5. A-1 Attempted to Bring Gerald Lee into Court to Avoid 
Forfeiture of the Bonds. 
Beginning in February 1999, A-1 made several unsuccessful attempts to locate Mr. 
Lee and bring him into court in Colorado. (R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo., p. 34). 
These attempts included calling Mr. Lee's former employer, who had co-signed on the 
bonds, and calling Mr. Lee's mother in Vernal. (R. 1187, p. 254, pp. 34-38). On April 1, 
1999, Maria Thorpe called his employer again and told him she would be coming to 
Vernal soon to pick up Mr. Lee and remand him back to the Colorado court's custody. 
(R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. pp. 38). 
6. Miles Langley Apprehended Gerald Lee on April 2,1999. 
Maria Thorpe testified that she did not have a chance to apprehend Mr. Lee 
herself, because Miles Langley traveled to Vernal and apprehended him without her 
3The Mesa County Court issued a Notice of Forfeiture on January 25, 1999, 
ordering Mr. Lee to appear on March 9, 1999, but is is not known what became of this ®. 
999, Exhibit 1, p. 004). 
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direction or knowledge. (R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. p. 38) Ms. Thorpe tesiwtcu 
iiun A-i did «n..
 f.)h »M i,i.. *.. * o> . •> jppi'w..wiu. *., . ^ but speculated that 1 le 
k'iinx ill o( llir iinprmlnif.1, hirlrilurr ol (In1 bniitll ml Minvlnir Mir nrlii lo nninrehendMr. 
Lee, by looking through courthouse records for Notice oi f oiieituiw. ^i~ . _ / , p. 254, 
M. Thorpe depo pp. 39-40) ' . ' 
The Lees deposed Mi I angle) in 2002. (R 118 ) \ > 55) I le testified that lie wi is 
inquire whether he was licensed as a bail recovery agent in Utah in 1999. (R. 1187, p. 
55). However, Mr. I ,angley had apprehended fugitives in Utah "numerous times" prior to 
1999. (R. 118 7 i > ; 0) 
I" ti I angle> cLiimrM (lull Il lliiiii il linn I ippivhmd If In I iiii t 
he never had any contact with Ranger and that "they had no idea" A- 1 had lined him. (R. 
1187, pp. 74, 80). Mr. Langley testified that he went to the Mesa County courthouse to 
confirm -»u. ^ere was an outstanding warrant for Mi I ee' s ai rest on a D U I charge (R. • 
1 1 8 7 | • i \ t I < i Mil \ i • 111111 N1 K T i f f s 1 V p ; n 11 n i M I I 11 , \ f > i 
told the assistant sheriff he was going to apprehend Mr. Lee. (R. 1187, p. b~j. * ~w 
assistant sheriff fold Mr Tangle} that Mr. l.ee was staying at the home of his brother 
George Lee .:;:•. . r ^ L... , .: ia. J . I ^ . O U S to George I ,ee' s home (R 118 7 , p 82) \ s 
I"1 111. Laiiule^ ncaicd (jeoiute Lee's homi, he slopped al the Nuplcs Poliu: DcparliiR'nl ami 
told a police officer that he was in town to apprehend Gerald Lee. (R. 1187, p. 83). After 
Mr. Langley showed the officer the arrest warrant, the officer gave Mr. Langley specific 
9 
directions to George Lee's home. (R. 1187, p. 83). 
Mr. Langley arrived at George Lee's home and entered the home after telling 
George Lee, who answered the door, that he was with a construction company and 
wanted to give Gerald Lee a job. (R. 1187, pp. 85-86). Mr. Langley entered the home, 
shook Gerald Lee's hand, then told him he had a warrant for Mr. Lee's arrest. (R. 1187, 
p. 86). A scuffle ensued, and George Lee testified that as he went to help his brother, Mr. 
Langley elbowed him. (R. 1187, pp. 192-193). Gerald Lee testified that he was also 
physically injured in the fight. (R. 1187, p. 119). 
Officers from the Naples Police Department arrived at George Lee's home shortly 
afterward.4 (R. 1187, p. 90). Mr. Langley took Gerald Lee into custody and drove him to 
Grand Junction, Colorado, where he was put in jail. (R. 1187, p. 97). Gerald Lee 
testified that he went with Mr. Langley because Naples police officer Steve Hatzidakis 
told him he would be arrested if he did not accompany Mr. Langley. (R. 1187, p. 125). 
7. The Lees Sued Ranger for Assault, Reckless Endangerment, 
False Imprisonment and Punitive Damages. 
Although Ranger never had any contact with Mr. Langley, did not hire him to 
apprehend Mr. Lee and was not aware of any fight between the Lees and Mr. Langley 
until it was served with the Lees' Complaint, the Lees relied upon Utah Code Ann. §31A-
35-601(2) as their basis for suing Ranger for Mr. Langley's actions. (R. 1187, p. 260). 
4They cited Langley and the Lees for assault. (Appellants' Brief, xii). Mr. 
Langley later plead down his citation to disorderly conduct. (R. 1025). 
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This statute states that: 
I he acis or conduct ul any . , . ,,ui; recovery agent. . . who acts within me scope of 
"* uHhority delegated to him by the bail bond surety, are considered *»> be the :\•"• 
w. conduct of the bail v^.nJ «^M<-.-, O„. *» w,h fae bail. rec<">*n -i^-^ v *-. •  . 
a gen i 
Ranger presented evidence at Uiai that it did not delegate any authority to Mi Langley to 
apprehend Mr I ?e. (R 11 *", pp 259-60; R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. pp. 39-40, 
I . 
8 1 lie Lees Requested a Default Against Robert Thorpe that 
Would Have the Legal Effect of a Directed Verdict Against 
Ranger on the Issue of Liability, a Request Judge Payne 
Recognized as Overrreaching. 
., oginnniL w. . ,v rial inteLiuaj) JK iA.e-uAei; »-I...^ I p.nie f^ a n f o r 
,,. ;he Lees argued lhalii Ui. i:%rv ^ranted default - ••* * •-* .urainsi Mr. 1 lion** -'iic 
" effect would be that Ranger would become automatically liable, and thr . »niy ^ ,ur 
for the jury to decide would be damage*
 ; 
denied that A-l lined Mr. LamHc* (R. 88-91). Alalia, lhorpt ^o-ownei of 
A
 * testified at trial (through her deposition testimony) that VI di^i.oi hia Mr. 
l^angi- ;•, that t ! i 1 had a legal right to apprehend I"l Ii , Lee, and that Kanger did not 
delegate .in <> iiilhunl, In I' III! 1  .mpji \ |l!« III1 , p J1 I, M I Imipi ijejiui, pp IS, Si 51). 
Frances Trevino, bail operations department supervisor with Ranger, confirmed that 
R i iiiger did not delegate any authorit\ ir \ I : T angle\ (R 11 ;~. pp 256, 258-64). 
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Notwithstanding this, the Lees contended that a default should enter against Mr. Thorpe, 
and that the effect would be to instruct the jury that Ranger was liable to the Lees for 
assault, reckless endangerment, false imprisonment and punitive damages. (R. 1187, pp. 
16-18). 
Judge Payne denied the Lees' request to default Robert Thorpe, noting that he was 
not required to default Mr. Thorpe under the circumstances, that it would be inappropriate 
to punish Ranger for Mr. Thorpe's failure to appear when Ranger had no control over 
him, and that it would be improper to take the issue of liability away from the jury when 
the evidence and the law did not justify it. (R. 1187, pp. 17-18). 
9. Judge Payne Dismissed the Lees' False Imprisonment Claim 
Because They Could Not Meet the Legal Elements of This Claim. 
At the close of the Lees' case in chief, Ranger moved for a partial directed verdict 
to dismiss the Lees' false imprisonment claim. (R. 1187, p. 213). The judge concluded 
that George Lee had presented no evidence that Mr. Langley confined or imprisoned him; 
Mr. Langley merely entered his home and allegedly struck him, but that action did not 
equate to confinement or imprisonment. (R. 1187, pp. 213-215, 222). Judge Payne 
further concluded that Gerald Lee had presented no evidence that Mr. Langley acted 
without reasonable grounds to believe Gerald Lee had committed an offense. (R. 1187, 
pp. 215-16). To the contrary, there were two separate legal bases for Mr. Langley to 
apprehend Gerald Lee: one stemming from Mr. Lee's contractual assent to be 
apprehended in the Bail Bond Application and Contract, and one stemming from the 
common law set forth in Taylor v. Taintor, 89 U.S. 366 (1872), which confers a right 
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upon bail bondsmen to apprehend fugitives, (R , 1187, pp. 215-16). 
10. llthough Judge Payne Ruled In Favor of the Lees on Many 
Legal Issues, the Jury Felt After Hearing the Evidence that Mr, 
Langley Did Not Assault or Recklessly Endanger the Lees and 
Entered a Verdict of No Cause of Action. 
Judge Payne observed at the outset of the trial that the Lees were taking 
incongruous positions with respect to Utah's Bail Bond Recovery Act, I Jtah Code \ nn. 
§§5 1 II 11)1 <Mn/ (R l ln1 [i|i it ."TJ'I. ilic linl 1'Uniul Niiiftit;>A Aguuh.'u! I Ihili 
the Lees claimed without any supporting evidence that Mr. Langley was not a licensed 
bail recovery agent in Utah and therefore acted without legal authority to apprehend Mr. 
Mr. Langley, A 1 and Ranger . (R. 1187, p. 6). Ranger urged the trial court not to apply 
the statutes due to this inconsistency, (R , 1187, p. 9) However, the judge permitted the 
. , • * ij 
1030;. Jud}-* l>::yne also allowed IIK'•• ,, uvei Ra?uvr> oh- •. < f •- * ,:tedthat 
" .sis 'ITOVCII iL-c'it is ai':"-: withi. ;he scope of ainimrity delegated b\ a bail boi:J 
surety when the work performed by the agent benein> ihe surety. (R , 1029) 
5The Lees contend that Judge Payne "ruled eat 1:> on in it le trial that the I Jtah 
licensing statute would not be used," but he never made such a ruling or otherwisi i 
.mined its applicability. (Appellants' Brief, p. 5; R. 1187, pp. 4-7, 9-12). 
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Finally, Ranger attempted to dismiss the punitive damages claim against it, both in 
a motion for summary judgment before trial and in a motion for directed verdict after the 
close of the Lees' case in chief. (R. 477-633; R. 1187, p. 223). Ranger contended that if 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-35-601 was a vicarious liability statute, as the Lees argued it was, 
it could only make Ranger vicariously liable in compensator/ damages for Mr. Langley's 
acts that Ranger may have delegated to him, but not vicariously liable in punitive 
damages. (R. 477-633). Ranger further argued that the Lees presented no evidence that it 
acted with the requisite degree of culpability to impose punitive damages under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-18-1(2004). (R. 1187, p. 225). However, Judge Payne allowed the issue 
of punitive damages to go to the jury, subjecting Ranger to huge financial exposure. (R. 
1187, p. 226). 
The Lees presented four witnesses on their behalf at trial and were armed with the 
above favorable legal rulings. (R. 1187, p. 2). At the close of evidence, the jury received 
a Special Verdict form that first asked if Mr. Langley had assaulted the Lees; and second, 
if he had recklessly endangered them. (R. 1009-1012). The jury answered both of these 
questions in the negative, thereby resulting in a verdict of no cause of action against any 
defendant. (R. 1009-1012). 
Because the jury found that Mr. Langley did not assault or recklessly endanger the 
Lees, it did not need to and did not reach the other questions on the Special Verdict form; 
namely, what the fault apportionment should be among Mr. Langley, George Lee and 
Gerald Lee; whether Mr. Langley was acting within the scope of any authority delegated 
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by A-1 (in oilier words,, whether A-1 hired him,, to apprehend Mr. Lee); whether he was 
acting within the scope of any authority delegated by R anger; what amount of 
i iiifxnsfiloin ijaiiiiiif.'cs \\J< n iiirdiilnl am! wlicllin IMIIIIIIM1 diinuigts \u:it w manli il 
(R. 1009-1012). 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
P O r I he I ees' first issue on, appeal, suffers from.,, several, shortcomings. First, 
there v asampk INUIUIU lllial Is 11 I anglcy, m am hail innvei^ ayt'iil ton 
t j i a t matter, had a let1 a I nvM to appniini 1 <KTMH I tv .is a Unn\t\ r \)« sn Ih. 
Colorado coi irt. Taj flof • i ' Taintor, supra, confers a common law right upon 
bail recovery agents to apprehend fugitives who have outstanding arrest 
II1L1I1 > iiiluk'^  llii* I a . i Hi1 iibiugatch that 
law right. Additionallv aaiiai .in illnniativr ln«al basis Im 
,
 x A ehending Mr. Lee, he contractually consented to his apprehension when 
he purchased iin. IMM bonds from * 1 
"\ri;ni(»i"l fhi» il r t .. n » I I I ( i k ' t e i \ i f i j IOl t / l i l t ' "I H, "I ' • " " • » " » » " !!! !" |,k "' ' - C 
wuiiscntcd tu • i{^prehension in their appellate bncl. M '* "e failed to 
..• Oial the evidence supporting the trial cowl"- decision to recognize the 
,..„,.. , »nguage of the contract, 
• iructed the jury 
0 E the j a w 0f arrest has not been preserved on appeal ' I he I ees foiled, to 
take exception at trial, to the instructions they are now objecting to on appeal 
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and therefore cannot challenge their validity on appeal. 
Fourth, any error on the trial court's part, and there was none, is harmless. 
The law on arrest was not pertinent to the jury's consideration of whether 
Mr. Langley assaulted or recklessly endangered the Lees. 
POINT II: The trial court did not err in dismissing the Lees' claim for false 
imprisonment because they did not present any evidence in their case in 
chief that George Lee was confined or imprisoned or that Mr. Langley 
apprehended Gerald Lee without a reasonable basis for doing so. They did 
not take exception to the jury instructions they are challenging on appeal 
and thus have waived their right to challenge them. 
POINT III: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to enter default 
judgment against Robert Thorpe, particularly when the Lees contended that 
the legal effect of default judgment would be to instruct the jury that Ranger 
was liable to the Lees for all claims. Again, the Lees ignored their duty to 
marshal the evidence supporting the judge's ruling in this regard, and this 
Court should therefore affirm the ruling. 
POINT IV: The trial court's ruling that George Lee could not testify as to what he 
allegedly heard Miles Langley say in another court proceeding was correct 
because the testimony was unreliable hearsay and was otherwise 
inadmissible. Even if the trial court had allowed the testimony, it would not 
have changed the outcome of the case. Whether Mr. Langley had a Utah 
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bail recovery license had no bearing on whether he assaulted or recklessly 
endangered the Lees. 
POINT V: The trial court properly excluded from evidence a document containing 
cryptic handwriting, purportedly showing that Mr. Thorpe paid Mr. Langley 
for apprehending Gerald Lee. The document constituted hearsay. In any 
event, the Lees achieved their objective of introducing evidence that Mr. 
Thorpe hired Mr. Langley through other means, including Gerald Lee's 
testimony that he witnessed Mr. Thorpe hand Mr. Langley cash, and Mr. 
Langley's testimony that Mr. Thorpe paid him for apprehending Mr. Lee. If 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit this document, there 
is no harmful error because the jury did not reach the issue of whether Mr. 
Langley acted within the scope of any authority delegated by A-1. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LEES' CONTENTION THAT GERALD LEE 
COULD NOT BE APPREHENDED DEFIES COMMON SENSE, 
COMMON LAW, AND CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS. 
Gerald Lee had two outstanding warrants for his arrest in Colorado in 1999. He 
would have been required to remain in jail in Colorado until his court hearings had A-1 
not issued him bail bonds releasing him from the court's custody into A-l's custody. In 
exchange for his freedom, he agreed that if he failed to show up for court hearings, A-1 
could apprehend him. He agreed that if he left Colorado, he could be apprehended. He 
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further promised that if he were apprehended by A-l, he would voluntarily agree to return 
to Colorado. Finally, he consented to the use of reasonable force against him to assure his 
return to Colorado. (R. 999, Exhibit 2). 
The Lees' assertion that he was immune from apprehension and was absolved 
from answering for his criminal offenses because he crossed state lines defies common 
sense. Their contention that Judge Payne misinterpreted the law of arrest overlooks 
longstanding common law permitting bail recovery agents to cross state lines to 
apprehend fugitives, and it ignores that Mr. Lee contractually consented to apprehension. 
A, There Were Ample Legal Bases for Apprehending Mr, Lee, 
The focus of the Lees' first issue on appeal is whether Mr. Langley was licensed as 
a bail recovery agent in Utah. They complain that they should have been able to 
introduce hearsay evidence that he did not have a Utah license because they missed their 
opportunity to ask him when they deposed him whether he was licensed in Utah. They 
believe that if he was not licensed in Utah, he had no authority to apprehend Mr. Lee, but 
this is incorrect in many respects. 
Significantly, there is nothing in the tangled statutory web they cite (Utah Code 
Ann. §§53-11-101, etseq., §§31A-35-601, etseq. and §§77-20-1, et seq.) suggesting that 
a bail recovery agent who is duly licensed in another state cannot enter Utah to apprehend 
a fugitive. The Lees repeatedly assert on appeal that the statutes prohibit the 
apprehension of an individual in Utah by someone who is not licensed in Utah, but they 
are unable to point to any statutory provision that says this. Instead, the statutes appear to 
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govern bail bond sureties, bail bond agencies, and bail bond recovery agents who reside 
in and operate businesses in Utah. The statutes do not address, and were not meant to 
address, out-of-state sureties or recovery agents who must pursue a fugitive in Utah 
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant from another state. 
While the statutes the Lees rely upon do not deal with the situation that arose in 
this case, Mr. Langley testified that he had apprehended fugitives in Utah on several prior 
occasions without incident. On this occasion, he informed local law enforcement 
authorities that he was apprehending Mr. Lee pursuant to valid Colorado arrest warrants. 
The Utah authorities did not stop Mr. Langley or inquire if he was licensed in Utah; 
instead, they acknowledged his authority to apprehend Mr. Lee and directed Mr. Langley 
to his whereabouts. 
There were two separate legal bases for Mr. Lee to be apprehended in Utah. First, 
the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1872) that 
[w]hen bail is given, the principal [fugitive] is regarded as delivered to the custody 
of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment. 
Whenever they choose to do so, they may seize him and deliver him up in their 
discharge . . . . They may pursue him into another State; may arrest him on the 
Sabbath; and if necessary, may break and enter his house for that purpose. 
Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. at 371. Ms. Thorpe testified that Taylor v. Taintor gives bail 
bond agents the authority to apprehend fugitives, and to enter another state to do so. (R. 
1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. p. 13). Judge Payne reviewed Taylor v. Taintor during the 
trial and observed that it confers a common law right for a bail recovery agent to enter 
Utah to act upon an arrest warrant. (R. 1187, p. 215). 
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The Lees downplay Taylor v. Taintor by referring to a few cases from other 
jurisdictions in which the courts determined under different circumstances that state 
statutes could override the common law. For example, the court in Walker v. 
Commonwealth, 127 S.W.3d 596 (Ky. 2004), concerned a bondsman who detained an 
individual in Kentucky without an arrest warrant, in violation of Kentucky law 
prohibiting a bondsman from detaining without a warrant. In this case, there were two 
valid arrest warrants for Gerald Lee, and Utah's bail recovery statutes are different from 
Kentucky's. The case of Green v. State, 829 S.W.2d 222 (Texas App. 1992), is 
inapposite because the Texas court concluded that the state legislature intended to 
abrogate Taylor v. Taintor by passing laws that squarely contradicted it. The Lees cannot 
point to any Utah statute that contradicts the common law principle of apprehension in 
another state set forth in Taylor v. Taintor. The court in Johnson v. County of Kittitas, 11 
P.3d 862 (Wash.Ct.App. 2001), merely expressed its view that Taylor v. Taintor contains 
dicta but also acknowledges that "it is generally understood to be the seminal authority on 
the bond surety's common law authority to seize and surrender the principal...." Johnson, 
11 P.3d. at 864. Finally, the court in McFarland v. State, 666 N.W. 2d 621 (Iowa Ct. 
App. 2003), simply noted that Taylor v. Taintor did not allow a bondsman to break into 
the home he mistakenly thought housed a fugitive. 
Even if Utah statute supplanted Taylor v. Taintor, which it does not, there was a 
separate legal basis permitting Mr. Lee's apprehension. Mr. Lee freely signed a contract 
on 
in which he agreed and consented to apprehension. He acknowledged that by purchasing 
the bail bonds he was submitting himself to the custody of A-l. The Bail Bond 
Application & Contract plainly states that if he commits any act that could cause 
forfeiture of the bond, he can be apprehended; he was aware that his failure to appear for 
the Colorado court hearings constituted forfeiture of the bond, he acknowledged receiving 
a Notice of Forfeiture from the Rio Blanco court stating that the bond could be forfeited 
for his failure to appear at the December 1998 court hearing. The contract he signed 
additionally provides that if he leaves Colorado, he agrees that he can be apprehended and 
brought back to Colorado. He has never alleged that these terms are somehow invalid or 
unenforceable. 
There was ample reason for the trial court to determine that it did not matter 
whether Mr. Langley was licensed as a bail recovery agent in Utah. The judge's 
conclusion that Mr. Lee could be apprehended was supported by common law and 
contract law, as well as the common sense notion that those who try to evade the law by 
leaving one state for another can be brought to justice. 
B. The Lees Did Not Marshal the Evidence Showing the Contractual Basis 
for Apprehending Mr. Lee, 
When, as here, appellants dispute a ruling that is based on factual findings, they 
must marshal the evidence supporting the ruling and show that such evidence cannot 
support the ruling. Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 48 P.3d 888 (Utah 
2002). Failure to marshal the evidence means the reviewing court will not disturb the 
trial court's ruling on appeal. Neely v. Bennett, 519 P.3d 724 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
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The Bail Bond Application & Contract was admitted in evidence in its entirety at 
trial, and Mr. Lee conceded that he signed it. The Lees did not present any testimony at 
trial to undermine the validity of this document. Perhaps because of this, the Lees barely 
acknowledge its existence on appeal, instead claiming that Taylor v. Taintor is a relic. 
The Lees have failed to present, "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists; after constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger 
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence, and the gravity of that flaw must be sufficient 
to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly 
erroneous." Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d at 727. Therefore, the Lees cannot prevail on their 
first issue on appeal. 
C. The Lees Did Not Preserve This Issue for Appeal. 
The Lees claim that the trial court's alleged error in misapplying the law on arrest 
culminated in its refusal to give their requested jury instructions on this subject. The two 
jury instructions they claim should have been read are "Utah law requires a bail bond 
recovery agent to operate only when licensed by the state of Utah," and citizens "without 
law enforcement authority" can make arrests in certain circumstances. (Appellants' 
Addendum 53-54). The first jury instruction does not accurately reflect the law, and it 
was irrelevant because there was no evidence Mr. Langley was not licensed in Utah. The 
second jury instruction was not read because there was no evidence Mr. Langley made an 
arrest without law enforcement authority. 
The Lees did not take exception to the trial court's refusal to read these 
instructions to the jury. Trial counsel must formally make exceptions to jury instructions 
on the record, before the jury retires to deliberate on the evidence. Jones v. Cyprus 
Plateau Mining Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997). It does not appear from the trial 
court transcript that exceptions were conducted. The parties discussed proposed jury 
instructions with Judge Payne in his chambers on February 3, 2004 (R. 1187, pp. 291-
307), but this discussion did not include formal exceptions or any objections to specific 
instructions, and the Lees' counsel states on the record that exceptions would occur later. 
(R. 1187, p. 307). The next reference to jury instructions in the trial transcript comes the 
next morning, before Judge Payne read the instructions to the jury. The Lees' counsel 
states at that point that there are no objections to the jury instructions. (R. 1187, p. 310). 
Failure to take exception to a jury instruction with specificity precludes the party 
from objecting on appeal that the instructions were defective. Jones v. Cyprus Plateau 
Mining Corp., 944 P.2d at 359. "[T]o assert that the trial court erred in either giving or 
failing to give an instruction, a party must first submit correct instructions and then, 
should the court fail to give them, timely except." Paulos v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 86 
P.3d 752, 754 (Utah Ct. App. 2004), citation omitted. 
D. Whether Mr, Langley had Legal Authority to Apprehend Mr, Lee was 
not Relevant to the Jury's Verdict So Any Error was Harmless, 
Even if the trial court had permitted the Lees to present evidence that Mr. Langley 
was not licensed in Utah, and even if the jury heard instructions to the effect that an 
individual cannot be apprehended unless the person apprehending him is licensed in Utah 
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as a bail recovery agent, that would not have changed the outcome at trial. The jury 
quickly disposed of the Lees' lawsuit by finding that the Lees were not assaulted or 
recklessly endangered. Authority to arrest had nothing to do with their claims for assault 
or reckless endangerment; rather, it pertained to their false imprisonment claim. The 
Lees' counsel conceded that "[t]he licensing law has very little to do with the liability of 
this case except that it establishes an element of false imprison[ment in] that there was 
unlawful activity of the arrest, if you will, the detaining was not based in law." (R. 1187, 
p. 20). 
An appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that a trial court error was harmful, 
that is, "that there is a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 489-90 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). In Steffensen, the plaintiff challenged the trial court's reading of the 
defendant's jury instruction on foreseeability, which pertained to her negligence claim. 
Although the appellate court determined that the trial court should not have read the 
instruction, it noted that the jury found the defendant was negligent, so the reading of the 
erroneous instruction was harmless. Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 490; see also Albrecht v. 
Bennett, 44 P.3d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (error that does not affect outcome of case is 
harmless and will not warrant reversal). 
The law of arrest did not pertain to the claims presented to the jury. If the trial 
court had read the Lees' requested instructions to the jury, it would not have changed the 
result. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY 
DISMISSED THE FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIM 
FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE 
Since the Lees were unable to assemble evidence in their case in chief that Mr. 
Langley falsely imprisoned them, the trial court granted Ranger's motion for partial 
directed verdict against their false imprisonment claim. The Lees had the burden of 
showing that (1) Mr. Langley acted, intending to confine or restrain the Lees; (2) his 
actions resulted in the Lees' confinement or restraint; (3) the Lees were conscious of or 
were harmed by the confinement or restraint; and (4) Mr. Langley acted without having 
reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Lee committed an offense. (R. 903). 
With respect to George Lee's claim for false imprisonment, he never testified at 
trial that Mr. Langley confined him, restrained him, or made him feel he could not leave. 
(R. 903). There was no evidence that Mr. Langley confined or imprisoned George Lee. 
As the trial court aptly noted, Mr. Langley may have entered his home under false 
pretenses and engaged in a scuffle with him and his brother, and that may have given rise 
to claims for trespass or assault, but not for false imprisonment. (R. 1187, p. 214). 
With respect to Gerald Lee's claim, the trial court concluded that there was no 
evidence that Mr. Langley acted without reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Lee 
committed an offense. Mr. Langley stated in his deposition that he was apprehending 
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Gerald Lee pursuant to his belief that there were valid arrest warrants in Colorado for Mr. 
Lee. The Lees offered no evidence that Mr. Langley was lying about his belief, or that 
the arrest warrants were invalid. Additionally, the trial court observed that since Mr. Lee 
contractually consented to apprehension, he "is not in a position now to complain that the 
arrest was unlawful." ( R. 1187, p. 216). The court properly dismissed the false 
imprisonment claim for lack of evidence. 
No reasonable jury could have found based on the evidence offered by the Lees 
that George Lee had been imprisoned or confined, or tliat Mr. Langley was not acting 
with reasonable grounds to believe Gerald Lee was not evading arrest warrants. The trial 
court's grant of directed verdict must therefore be affirmed. See Goebel v. Salt Lake City 
Southern R. Co., 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (2004) (directed verdict on proximate cause 
affirmed where no reasonable jury could find that small defect in road caused bicycle 
accident). Additionally, the jury instructions the Lees claim should have been read 
pertaining to false imprisonment were not formally objected to, so the Lees cannot 
complain of error on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO DEFAULT MR. THORPE FOR FAILURE 
TO APPEAR 
A. The Lees Misconstrued the Proper Legal Effect of a Default. 
If the trial judge had exercised his discretion and granted default judgment against 
Mr. Thorpe in favor of the Lees, the appropriate result would be that the Lees would have 
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a judgment against A-l alone for their claims, and they could attempt to collect monies 
from A-l based on that judgment. However, the Lees clearly view a default against Mr. 
Thorpe as a far more expansive weapon. They contend that a default judgment against 
Mr. Thorpe would have also given them a judgment against Ranger on liability, and that 
the only issue left for the jury to decide would be how much to award against Ranger for 
compensatory and punitive damages. (Appellants' Brief, p. 13). 
The Lees' position does not make sense. They complain that Mr. Thorpe deserved 
to have a default judgment entered against him because he failed to appear at trial, yet 
they have no qualms about arguing that Ranger should be held automatically liable in 
damages to them, even though Ranger appeared at trial. They urged the trial court to 
determine as a matter of law, before any party presented evidence, that Mr. Langley 
assaulted, recklessly endangered and falsely imprisoned the Lees; and that Ranger 
authorized these actions. The Lees wanted the trial court to prohibit Ranger from putting 
on a case and defending itself, merely because an individual over whom Ranger had no 
control failed to show up for trial. If third parties could be so severely punished for 
someone's failure to appear in court, Ranger would have been well positioned to ask that 
George Lee be flogged because his brother did not appear in court in Colorado. 
The trial court accurately sensed that the Lees would attempt to abuse a default 
judgment against Mr. Thorpe and exercised it discretion to refuse the Lees' request. The 
third issue on appeal does not raise any grounds for disturbing the jury's verdict. 
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B, The Trial Court Granted Ranger's Request for Default Judgment 
against A-1 Because there was No Dispute that A-1 was Obligated to 
Indemnify Ranger for Costs Associated with the TriaL 
The Lees' argument that the trial court was required to grant the Lees a default 
judgment against Robert Thorpe on their claims once it granted Ranger default judgment 
against A-1 for contractual indemnity ignores that the bases for granting the default 
judgment would be entirely different. The Lees asked the trial court to default Mr. 
Thorpe because failed to appear for trial. On the other hand, Ranger asked the trial court 
for judgment on its indemnity claim against A-1 because there was no claim and no 
evidence that the contractual indemnity clause between A-1 and Ranger was invalid or 
unenforceable. Moreover, it asked for judgment either in the form of a directed verdict or 
a default judgment. 
Ranger filed a cross-claim against A-1 in 2002 for contractual indemnity. ( R. 
111-114). Specifically, the Bail Bond Underwriting Agreement between A-1 and Ranger 
states that A-1 shall "indemnify, hold and save [Ranger] harmless from 100% of any and 
all costs, expenses and liabilities, including but not limited to . . . attorneys' fees . . . trial 
preparation expenses, court costs . . . and the like . . . in connection with the subject 
matter of this Agreement.. . ." (R. 999, Exhibit 2). A-1 never challenged the validity of 
this indemnification duty or otherwise presented evidence against it. (R. 1187, 226-27). 
Consequently, Ranger moved during trial for a directed verdict against A-1 on its 
indemnity cross-claim, or in the alternative, a default judgment against A-1. (R. 1187, pp. 
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226,252). 
Judge Payne granted both motions in the alternative. (R. 1187, p. 252). Thus, if 
Judge Payne somehow became obligated to grant the Lees' request for default against Mr. 
Thorpe just by granting Ranger's request for default against A-l, such mechanical 
reasoning could be avoided by recognizing that the judgment against A-l was 
alternatively a directed verdict. 
C. Because the Lees did not Marshal the Factual Circumstances Justifying 
Judge Payne's Denial of Their Request for Default Judgment This 
Issue Cannot be Considered on Appeal, 
The Lees do not explain in their appellate brief why Judge Payne ruled as he did. 
Since they ignore the factual underpinnings of his denial of their request for default 
judgment, this Court need not reach the merits of their third issue on appeal. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
PRECLUDING GEORGE LEE FROM TESTIFYING THAT MR. LANGLEY 
TESTIFIED IN ANOTHER COURT HEARING THAT 
HE DID NOT HAVE A UTAH LICENSE 
A. The Proposed Testimony was Inadmissible Hearsay. 
During the direct examination of George Lee, the Lees' counsel asked him about a 
justice court hearing he attended in Colorado regarding the assault citations issued to him, 
his brother and Mr. Langley arising from the April 2, 1999 scuffle. (R. 1187, p. 200). 
When Mr. Lee began to testify that Mr. Langley made a certain statement in the justice 
court hearing, Ranger objected on the ground of hearsay. (R. 1187, p. 200). The trial 
court sustained the objection. (R. 1187, p. 202). 
The Lees now ask for a new trial because the judge's ruling was allegedly 
incorrect. Nonetheless, the question posed by the Lees' counsel, and the partial answer 
Mr. Lee gave, show that the proposed testimony was hearsay. Mr. Lee was intending to 
testify that Mr. Langley made a certain remark on a prior occasion. Hearsay "is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah Rule of Evidence 
801(c). 
The proposed testimony does not fall outside the definition of hearsay, nor is it an 
exception to the hearsay rule. It is not an admission by a party opponent, as the Lees 
allege, because the statement was not being offered against Mr. Langley, it was being 
offered against Ranger. Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). Additionally, for a statement 
to be considered an admissible admission by a party opponent, the proponent must 
demonstrate that the declarant "manifested an adoption or belief in its truth." Utah Rule 
of Evidence 801(d)(2). The Lees did not make this showing to the trial judge before he 
sustained Ranger's objection, nor do they make this showing on appeal. 
The Lees' alternative assertion that the proposed testimony constituted a statement 
against interest under Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) is equally faulty. A statement 
"which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or 
proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, 
or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in 
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true" 
10 
qualifies as a hearsay exception under this rule. Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). Mr. 
Langley had no reason to believe that he was jeopardizing his self-interest if he testified 
he was not a licensed Utah agent. Indeed, the Lees did not shown Mr. Langley had any 
cause to think he would be exposing himself to liability for damages stemming from the 
April 2, 1999 scuffle if he were not licensed in Utah. Trial judges' rulings regarding Rule 
804(b)(3) are fact sensitive and are therefore based on their considerable discretion. State 
v. Webster, 32 P.3d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). Judge Payne did not abuse his discretion 
in precluding Mr. Langley's out-of-court statement. 
B. Any Error in Precluding this Testimony was Harmless. 
There are two separate reasons why any error in precluding George Lee from 
providing the proposed testimony would not warrant reversal of the jury's verdict. First, 
the Lees' attorney stated what the proposed testimony would be in the presence of the 
jury. In debating the objection from Ranger that Mr. Lee's impending comment, if 
uttered, would be hearsay, the Lees' counsel told the judge, in the jury's presence and 
earshot, that "we have an admission he's not licensed." (R. 1187, p. 201). Thus, the Lees 
achieved their intended objective, through their attorney instead of their witness. 
Second, the issue of whether Mr. Langley was a Utah-licensed bail recovery agent 
did not pertain to the questions of whether he assaulted or recklessly endangered the Lees. 
Had the jury heard from George Lee's mouth rather than their attorney's mouth that Mr. 
Langley testified he was not licensed in Utah, it would not have affected their decision 
that the Lees were not wronged by any defendant on April 2, 1999. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT A 
DOCUMENT ON REBUTTAL WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
After Ranger presented its case to the jury, the Lees called Gerald Lee as a rebuttal 
witness. (R. 1187, p. 276). The Lees' counsel attempted to introduce a document in 
evidence purportedly containing Mr. Thorpe's handwriting and purportedly dated April 3, 
1999. (R. 1187, p. 277). The Lees hoped to introduce the document as evidence that Mr. 
Thorpe paid Mr. Langley for apprehending Gerald Lee, and therefore as evidence that Mr. 
Langley was hired by A-1 to apprehend Gerald Lee. (R. 1187, p. 280). Ranger objected 
that the document was not authenticated and that it constituted hearsay, and the court 
sustained the objection. (R. 1187, pp. 278-79). 
The trial court correctly rejected the Lees' argument that the document qualified as 
an admission by a party opponent under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). The Lees were 
attempting to introduce this document not against Mr. Thorpe, who allegedly made an 
admission in the document, but against Ranger. Furthermore, at the time Mr. Thorpe 
allegedly marked the document, on April 3, 1999, the purported statement that he paid 
Mr. Langley was not an "admission." It was of no import on that date whether A-1 hired 
Mr. Langley, because the Lees had not yet filed their Complaint claiming that A-1 was 
liable for Mr. Langley's acts as its alleged employee. 
In any event, even if the trial court committed error by excluding the document, the 
error was not prejudicial. The Lees introduced evidence in their case in chief that Mr. 
Thorpe hired Mr. Langley to apprehend Gerald Lee, through the testimony of Mr. 
Langley, and through Gerald Lee's earlier testimony that he saw Mr. Thorpe hand Mr. 
Langley $350 in cash. (R. 1187, p. 131). Thus, the Lees had already achieved the 
purpose of providing testimony that Mr. Langley was acting under A-Ts direction and 
authority and that Mr. Thorpe had paid $350 to Mr. Langley. The introduction of the 
document would not have constituted true rebuttal testimony, but merely cumulative 
testimony. 
Additionally, the Lees argue that the document supported their claim that Mr. 
Langley was acting in the scope of authority delegated by A-1. This is a question the jury 
did not need to reach on the Special Verdict form. Because it had already determined that 
Mr. Langley did not commit any wrongful acts against the Lees, the issue of whether he 
acted independently or as A-lfs agent was moot. The Lees' final issue on appeal does 
not create harmful error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Lees do not challenge the jury's verdict, and it must stand. They have not 
offered any convincing reason for this Court to reverse the verdict and remand to the trial 
court for a second trial. Judge Payne did not commit any legal errors, much less any 
errors that would have changed the outcome. Ranger respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the judgment below. 
DATED this ,/¥* day of January, 2005. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
M iaime P. Blanch 
Tfystan B. Smith 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Ranger 
Insurance Company 
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The videotape deposition of MARIA E. 
THORPE, taken at the offices of Rusk & Rusk Court 
Reporters, 751 Horizon Court, Suite 110, Grand 
Junction, Colorado 81506, on the 22nd day of 
December, 2003, at 9:53 o'clock a.m., before 
Joppa H. Smith, Registered Professional Reporter 
and Notary Public at Large. 
* * * 
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Your Honor, ladies 
and gentlemen, today is December the 22nd 
of 2003. The following deposition is being 
videotaped by Esther Rusk of Rusk & Rusk 
Court Reporters, at the conference room of 
their office at Skyline Building, 751 
Horizon Court, Suite 110, Grand Junction, 
Colorado 81506, in the matter of George M. 
Lee and Gerald Lee, Plaintiffs, versus 
Miles Walter Langley, Robert P. Thorpe and 
The Ranger Insurance Company, Defendants, 
and filed in the Eighth Judicial District 
of Uintah County, State of Utah, Civil No. 
000800126. This deposition has been 
noticed by the Defendants, The Ranker 
Insurance Company. The deponent is Maria 
Thorpe. The time is approximately 9:55 
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a.m. 
Counsel will now identify themselves 
for the record. 
MS. BLANCH: Julianne Blanch for 
Ranger Insurance Company. 
MR. SANDERS: Craig Sanders for the 
Plaintiffs. 
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Joppa Smith, the 
court reporter, will now swear in the 
deponent. 
* * * 
MARIA E. THORPE, 
being produced and sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MS. BLANCH: 
Q. This is Julianne Blanch. Mrs. 
Thorpe, can you state your full name for the 
record. 
A. It's Maria Elizabeth Thorpe. 
Q. Do you own a business named A-l Bail 
Bonds? 
A. Not currently, no. 
Q. Did you in 1999? 
A. Yes. 
-po • * n8 
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1 Q. Where were the offices for A - l Bail 
2 Bonds in 1999? 
3 A. We had an office at 2 2 5 West Grand, 
4 and then at one point in 1999 w e m o v e d the 
5 office to 6 0 0 White Avenue. 
6 Q. In April o f 1999, where w a s it in 
7 Grand Junction, Colorado? 
I 8 A. I bel ieve it was still at 2 2 5 West 
9 Grand. 
10 Q. In 1999 , were there other owners of 
11 A - l Bail Bonds? 
12 A. It was a jo int ownership between 
13 mysel f and m y husband. 
14 Q. What is your husband's name? 
15 A. Robert Paul Thorpe. 
16 Q. Your husband has been named by the 
17 Lees as a defendant in this lawsuit, and I 
18 understand he has some health problem. 
19 There is a jury trial scheduled for 
20 this case in February, and if there is a reason 
21 that he doesn't show up due to his health, the 
22 jury may wonder w h y he's not there. 
23 Can y o u briefly explain his health 
24 problems, without getting into any things that 
25 are too private? 
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1 provide insurance to the court that a defendant 
2 wil l appear. 
3 If he doesn't appear, then w e write 
4 for the insurance company, and that i f w e don't 
5 pay the bond liability that the courts demand 
6 upon order o f judgment, then we're liable for 
7 that, the insurance company is liable for it, if 
8 the defendant is not remanded by the judgment due 
9 date. 
10 Q. Y o u mentioned that y o u provide an 
11 insurance to the court that a defendant wi l l 
12 appear. 
13 Are y o u talking about a criminal 
14 defendant or a civi l defendant? 
15 A. Criminal. 
\\6 Q. D o you have any certifications or 
17 licenses for your business? 
18 A. Yes , I 'm insured by the State of 
119 Colorado. I have an insurance producer 
20 license. 
21 Q. In your business , do you contract 
122 with sureties? 
23 A. Could y o u be more definitive? 
24 Q. Sure. Ranger, the company I 
25 represent, is a bail bonding surety. D o you 
Page 1 
1 A. Wel l , it began w i t h - - o n M a y 2 4 of 
2 19 - o f 2 0 0 0 , m y son passed away. A n d then in 
3 July of 2001 m y husband had a heart attack. And 
4 then in 2 0 0 2 he had a mi ld - y o u know, a 
5 partial stroke that impaired his sight. Then he 
6 had acute pancreatitis and an infection around 
7 the pancreas, which the doctors had to put in a 
8 drainage tube that w a s in place for several 
9 months. A perforated ulcer. So he's got an 
10 ongoing history of medical problems. 
11 Q. Can y o u tell us some of your 
12 background in the bonding business. 
13 When did y o u start? 
14 A. I 'm not sure o f the exact year. It 
15 would be in the neighborhood of maybe 1996, but 
16 I 'm not positive. 
17 Q. So y o u have been in the business 
18 since then? 
19 A. Yes , ma'am. 
20 Q. Is -- A - l Bail Bonds , w a s it a 
21 bonding agency? 
22 A. Yes . 
23 • Q. Can you describe for us what a 
24 bonding agency does? 
25 A. We're insurance producers. W e 
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1 contract with — 
2 A. Right. In order to write bonds in 
3 the State o f Colorado, y o u either have to be a 
4 cash bondsman, where you put up 5 0 , 0 0 0 with the 
5 state, otherwise, you have to receive an 
6 insurance appointment in conjunction with your 
7 l icense to produce bail. 
8 Q. In 1999 , w a s Ranger a surety for A - l 
9 Bail Bonds? 
10 A. Yes , ma 'am. 
11 Q. Were there any other sureties at the 
12 time? 
13 A. Later in 1999 w e had an appointment 
14 with Granite State Insurance. 
15 Q. Can y o u let us k n o w what a surety 
16 does in this bail bonding process? 
17 A. A surety is a — guarantees to the 
18 court that if the bondsman who posted the bond, 
19 and it's a contract that w e enter with the 
20 court, that i f the defendant is not remanded back 
21 into custody within the time al lowed b y the 
22 court prior to the entry o f judgment, then 
23 ultimately the surety is liable to the court for 
24 that amount. 
25 Q. Let's talk a little bit more about 
Notes * * * 
*** Notes *** 
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1 the bonding process. 
2 If a person is booked into jail for 
3 something like driving under the influence, they 
4 go to jail in Grand Junction, Colorado, they're 
5 booked. 
6 If they want to get out of jail, do 
7 they have to file a bond? 
8 A. Right. There's three types of bond 
9 in the State of Colorado. 
10 There's a cash bond. So if they 
11 have $500 cash, they can - if they have the cash 
12 at the time that they're booked in, they can 
13 request that the booking tech takes that cash 
14 from their books, and then that's forwarded to 
15 the court, and that's a secured bond. 
16 They can post a surety bond, and 
17 that's when they use a bail bondsman to post 
18 certified funds, you know, with the court. 
19 Or they can post a property bond. 
120 Actually, there's four types. 
121 There's also a PR bond, a personal recognizance 
22 bond, but they usually have to see the judge 
123 first before a judge will order a PR bond, or |24 they're interviewed by pre-trial services. 
25 Q. If someone who has been arrested 
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1 that could arise from a defendant's failure to 
2 appear. 
3 Q. So if a criminal defendant used you 
4 for a surety bond, and filled out an application 
5 with you, and then they failed to show up at 
6 court, the co-signer could be financially liable 
7 for their failure to appear? 
8 A. That's correct. 
9 Q. When a criminal defendant files a 
10 bond with your company, is he essentially 
11 released by the court into your custody? 
12 A. Right. It 's a continuation of their 
13 original incarceration. 
14 Q. So even though he's able to leave I 
15 the jail, is he still considered to be in the | 
16 custody of the court system and in the custody 
17 of A-1 Bail Bonds until he goes to court? 
18 A. Right. He's in legal contemplation 
19 of the surety, it 's just a continuation of his 
20 original incarceration. 
21 Q. Okay. When a criminal defendant is 
22 released from jail and then he has a court 
23 hearing, if he fails to show up for court, does 
[24 A-1 Bail Bonds have any right as a bonding 
25 agent to bring the criminal defendant into 
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1 wants to go the route of a surety bond to get 
2 out of jail, how would he find -- how would he 
3 hook up with A-1 Bail Bonds; would there be a 
4 list at the jail where he could choose among the 
5 various bail bondsmen in Grand Junction? 
6 A. At the jail, the jail is segmented 
7 into different pods, and each pod has a bulletin 
8 board by the phones, and on those bulletin 
9 boards are the advertisings of every bonding 
10 agency that wishes to advertise at that 
11 facility. 
12 Q. Okay. And if the person who has 
13 been arrested contacts your company for a surety 
14 bond, do you go out to the jail to meet him and 
15 get the paperwork signed? 
16 A. Procedurally, we contact a 
17 co-signer first, they call us by phone, we get 
18 the information, we get family information or 
19 friends who will indemnify the bond for us, 
20 contact them, the paperwork is done prior to the 
21 defendant' s release. 
22 Q. What is the role of a co-signer in 
23 the bonding process? 
24 A. They indemnify and hold the 
25 sureties harmless from the potential liability 
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I 1 court? 
2 A. We have a legal right to apprehend 
3 and return a defendant back into custody. 
4 That's a right that was provided to us way back 
5 in the common law, back to Taylor vs. Taintor 
6 back in the 1800s. That has been the basis of 
7 every statutory provision thereafter, so -
8 and it pretty much says that we can seize and 
9 surrender a defendant any time, any day, at any 
10 location. 
11 Q. You mentioned Taylor vs. Taintor. Is 
12 that a U.S. Supreme Court case? 
13 A. That 's correct. 
14 Q. And a pretty old one? 
15 A. Y e s . 
16 Q. When a criminal defendant files a 
17 bond with A-1 Bail Bonds, do you have him sign a 
18 bail bond application? 
19 A. Yes, he signs a bail bond 
20 application; he signs a checklist so he 
21 understands what his obligations to our company 
22 is and what his duties are to the court; he 
23 signs an appearance bond with the court that 
24 has special conditions on the appearance bond 
25 as well. 
* * * Notes * * * 
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Q. Okay. When he signs the application, 
is there a statement in there where the criminal 
defendant acknowledges that you can apprehend him 
and bring him to court if he fails to show up for 
a court hearing? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. Okay. Let's talk about the facts 
of this particular case involving Gerald Lee. 
As I understand it, Gerald Lee, one 
of the plaintiffs here, was arrested for a DUI 
by the Grand Junction, Colorado police on 
November 29, 1998; does that sound right to 
you? 
A. I would have to check my paperwork, 
because I don't have a recall of the exact 
dates. 
Q. Okay. 
A. If that's all right. 
Q. Yes, that's okay, please go ahead. 
And if it will help you with the 
dates, there's a bail bond application contract 
that's dated November 30, 1998. 
A. Right, that would have been the date 
of his release. 
Q. Okay. To shortcut the process, is 
*** ]sj0< 
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there's a signature, Gerald Lee, signed November 
30, 1998. 
And then the third page is entitled 
indemnitor/guarantor checklist. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let's talk a little bit about 
Exhibit No. 1. 
We were talking earlier about how a 
criminal defendant, when he wants to get out of 
jail, may elect to get a surety bond, and if he 
elects to choose A-l Bail Bonds as the bail 
bonding agent, then you have him sign a bail 
bonding application that sets forth the agreement 
among the parties. 
Have you seen Exhibit 1 before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And on the second page, if 
you could turn to that, there's a signature in 
the middle, Gerald Lee, dated November 30, 
1998. 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. To your knowledge, did he sign that 
document? 
A. As far as I know. 
Q. Okay. Is your husband usually the 
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it common that a criminal defendant would file 
a bail bond application within a day or two 
after he's been arrested for a criminal 
violation? 
A. It's - they generally file it at 
the time of their release. 
Q. From jail? 
A. Yeah. We go into the jail, we 
provide the necessary document to the court 
clerk - I mean to the jail clerk, and then the 
defendant is released to us in the lobby -- or 
at the office is generally where that paperwork 
is filled out, moments after his release. 
Q. Okay. Let's look at the bail bond 
application that Mr. Gerald Lee signed. 
MS. BLANCH: And we'll mark this as 
Exhibit 1. 
(Exhibit 1 marked). 
BY MS. BLANCH: 
Q. Mrs. Thorpe, Exhibit 1 is a 3-page 
bail bond application and contract, the top of 
it is dated November 30, 1998, and it says 
agent, Maria Thorpe, and at the top it says 
Ranger Insurance as well. 
The next page of it has writing, and 
_ . 
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one who is present when a criminal defendant is 
signing a bail bond application? 
A. No, generally I do the paperwork. 
Q. Okay. To the best of your 
recollection, did Mr. Lee sign that document in 
your presence? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Okay. Let's talk about the first 
page of the bail bond application, and paragraph 
1 towards the bottom of page 1 says, Ranger shall 
have control and jurisdiction over me. 
Is me Mr. Lee? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Okay. During the term for which my 
bail bond is executed and shall have the right 
to apprehend and surrender me to the proper 
officials at any time for violation of my bail 
bond obligation to the court and Ranger as 
provided by law. 
Can you explain for us what that 
means? 
A. What that means is that, as we 
discussed previously, Ranger Insurance and the 
surety, myself, have the right that if he 
violates any condition of bail, to go and 
* * * ^^ftfp^ 
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1 apprehend the defendant and remand h i m back 
2 into custody, so as to minimize our liability. 
3 Q. N o w , Ranger Insurance Company is in 
4 Texas. In all of your dealings with Ranger ~ 
5 first of all, did you deal with them on other 
6 criminal defendants besides Mr. Lee? 
7 A. Well , w e ' v e written hundreds of 
8 bonds through Ranger. 
j 9 Q. Okay. A t any t ime did you meet 
j 10 anyone from Ranger Insurance in person? 
II A. The only t ime that If ve ever met 
112 anyone from Ranger Insurance was at a Bail 
13 Association meeting in Las Vegas, and it w a s 
14 just - it didn't pertain to business as such, 
j 15 you know, concerning a specific defendant, no. 
16 Q. Okay. S o in the normal course of 
17 business, yous i ever met anyone from Ranger 
18 Insurance C o t i p a n y ? 
19 A. N o , ma'am. 
20 Q. D o e s Ranger Insurance Company ever 
21 meet any o f the bail bondsmen that y o u 
22 independently contract with? 
23 A. N o , ma'am. 
24 Q. If w e look at paragraph 2 A of the 
25 first page o f Exhibit 1, the bond application, 
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1 surety and o f the court, and if he did not 
2 obtain that - to m y knowledge , he did not obtain 
3 that consent. 
4 Q. A n d as you w o u l d learn later, he 
5 actually went to Utah w h e n he w a s released from 
6 Grand County -- or Grand Junction, Colorado jail , 
7 he went back to Utah? 
8 A. Yes . 
9 Q. Okay. So what he did was a violation 
10 of paragraph 2 A o f Exhibit 1, the bail bond 
11 application? 
12 A. Yes . 
13 Q. Okay. A n d then that gave Ranger 
14 and A - l Bail Bonds the right to apprehend 
15 him? 
16 A. Yes , ma 'am, to surrender him. 
17 MR. SANDERS: Excuse me, I 'm going 
18 to object, it cal ls for a legal conclus ion. 
19 Go ahead and answer. 
120 BY MS. BLANCH: 
21 Q. A n d - g o ahead. D i d y o u g ive your 
122 answer? 1 
123 A. Could y o u repeat yourself? 
24 Q. Sure. A n d did - the fact that he 
25 left to go to Utah, did that g ive Ranger and 
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1 it says , it is understood and agreed that any 
2 one o f the fo l lowing actions by me. 
3 A n d that is , again, Mr. Lee? 
4 A. Yes , ma'am. 
5 Q. Shall constitute a breach of m y 
6 obligations to Ranger, and that Ranger and/or its 
7 agent. 
8 Is A - l Bai l Bonds the agent? 
9 A. Yes , ma'am. 
10 Q. Shall have the right to forthwith 
11 apprehend and surrender me in exoneration o f m y 
12 bail bond. 
13 A n d subparagraph A says, if I depart 
14 the jurisdiction o f the court without the written 
15 consent of the court and Ranger or its agent. 
16 Can y o u explain to for us what that 
17 means? 
18 A. Well , as a condition o f the 
19 appearance bond, when Mr. Lee was released from 
20 custody, he signs an appearance bond, and, in 
21 effect, he's signing a contract with the 
22 court. 
23 Part o f the conditions of those 
24 bonds is that he cannot depart the jurisdiction 
25 o f Colorado without written consent of the 
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1 A - l Bail Bonds the right to apprehend him? 
2 A. Y e s , m a ' a m , that - at that point 
3 he violated his - not only his bail bond 
4 condit ions wi th the court, but he also 
5 violated his bail bond application and contract 
6 wi th us . 
7 Q. Okay. A n d w e were talking earlier 
8 about h o w if someone w h o files a bond, a criminal 
9 defendant, fails to s h o w up for a court hearing, 
10 that that a lso g ives A - l Bail Bonds , as the 
11 bonding agent, the right to go and apprehend 
12 him, even i f he doesn't leave the jurisdiction; 
13 is that correct? 
14 A. That's true. 
15 Q. Let's look at paragraph 3 of 
16 Exhibit 1. It says , if I depart the jurisdiction 
17 of the court wherein m y bail bond is posted by 
18 Ranger f o r - -
19 THE REPORTER: I'm sorry, could 
20 you -
21 MS. BLANCH: GO slower? 
22 THE REPORTER: Well, just a little 
23 bit. 
24 MS. BLANCH: Sure. 
25 BY MS. BLANCH: 
* * % ^^VvtpQ 
• • • ^^r^fpc * * * 
Page 2 6 
I 1 first one liable, but y o u said y o u have certain 
I 2 resources. 
3 A. Right. 
4 Q. Y o u can go against the co-signer, 
! 5 Mr. Wade Montgomery, and it also sounds like from | 6 this that you could go against Mr. Gerald Lee to 
7 get your money back? 
8 A. That's correct. 
I 9 Q. Okay. Paragraph 6 says, I 
110 understand I am responsible if it becomes 
111 necessary to arrest and surrender the 
112 defendant. 
• 1 3 Is Mr. Lee the defendant in this 
14 paragraph? 
15 A. That's correct. 
16 Q. A n d that I am responsible for 
17 paying all reasonable costs incurred for 
18 locating, apprehending, transporting and 
19 surrendering the defendant to custody. 
20 What does that mean? 
21 A. Back to the original jurisdiction. 
22 Well , to custody could mean any law enforcement 
23 agency can take h im into custody if it's-a 
24 warrant that's entered into NCIC. If it's a 
25 statewide warrant only, that means he has to be 
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1 of the indemnitor/guarantor checklist is $ 5 0 0 , 
2 and the premium amount is $75 . 
3 Does - h o w much did Wade Montgomery 
4 have to pay A - l Bail Bonds for the bond, if he 
5 is , in fact, the one that paid anything to A - l 
6 Bail Bonds? 
7 A. Well , the one w h o paid should have 
8 signed the receipt. I don't have the Ranger 
9 receipts, they're not in the file, the file 
10 that I have, the Ranger receipts. 
11 Ranger is a three-part contract, 
12 and the top t w o parts have a receipt and 
13 statement of charges, and then the top is for 
14 the collateral. So whoever signed the bottom 
15 here (indicating) w o u l d have been the one from 
16 w h o m w e received the monies from. 
17 Q. Okay. A n d Gerald Lee's signature 
18 is at the bottom of what you are showing us? 
19 A. This is the second bond. 
20 Q. Okay. 
21 A. So I don't know, without looking at 
22 the document, whether he p o s t e d - - w h e t h e r he 
J23 paid us or his co-signer did. 
24 Q. Okay. W e wi l l at some point take a 
125 break during this deposition and let you have a 
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1 returned to Colorado and remanded to any law 
2 enforcement officer within the State of 
3 Colorado. 
4 Q. Okay. A n d it's also talking about 
5 how he is responsible for paying reasonable costs 
6 for locating or apprehending him. 
7 If he does not show up to court and 
8 law enforcement or A - l Bail Bonds has to get 
9 him and bring h im to court, does this mean that 
10 he's responsible for the costs associated with 
11 that? 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. Let's look at parajgraph 7. I 
14 understand that if the bail is ordered forfeited 
15 by the court, that I am responsible to pay 
16 court costs and reasonable appearance or attorney 
17 fees, and a m i n i m u m of $ 1 1 0 0 is written in 
18 there, for the bail agent to reinstate or 
19 exonerate the bail bond if necessary. 
20 D o e s that mean that he has to pay 
21 up to $ 1 1 0 0 if he doesn't show up to court and 
22 either law enforcement or A - l Bail Bonds has to 
23 apprehend him? 
24 A. That's correct. 
25 Q. The amount of the bond at the top 
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1 chance to go through your file and see if you 
2 have a receipt for the original. 
3 A. I don't have that in here. 
4 Q. Okay. 
5 A. I don't k n o w what happened to it. 
6 Q. Okay. N o w , Gerald w a s supposed to 
7 appear in court on December 1 6 , 1 9 9 8 , and he 
8 failed to appear, according to court documents. 
9 Exhibit N o . 2 that we ' l l mark is a 
10 notice o f forfeiture and citation to show cause 
11 for Mr. Lee. 
12 (Exhibit 2 marked). 
13 BY MS. BLANCH: 
14 Q. Exhibit 2 , this notice of forfeiture, 
15 is stamped December 3 ~ excuse me, December 2 3 , 
16 1998, stamped by the court. 
17 Can y o u tell us what this document 
18 means? 
19 A. This is a notice from Rio Blanco 
20 court to m y s e l f and to Ranger Insurance and to 
21 Gerald Lee that - as we l l as the prosecuting 
22 attorney in his criminal case, that he failed to 
23 make his court appearance on the date that w a s 
24 scheduled by the court. 
25 Q. Okay. 
* * * Notes * * * 
* * * ^^otf*Q 
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1 A. Thereby forfeiting the bond. 
2 Q. Okay. And the date of the court 
3 appearance, it looks like, was December 16, 
4 1998? 
5 A. Yes, ma'am. 
6 Q. Okay. And he didn't show up for it 
7 is what this document is saying? 
8 A. That's correct. 
9 Q. Okay. And it then gives you a 
10 certain amount of time to apprehend him; is that 
11 right? 
12 A. Not - well, this document says 
13 that they scheduled a hearing for us to appear 
14 in Rio Blanco court to show cause. If we don't 
15 appear at the hearing or we don't have any legal 
16 grounds to show cause why judgment should not be 
17 entered against the surety, then at that time 
18 the court enters judgment. On the judgment 
19 document it will say that he has to be 
20 surrendered by a certain date, otherwise that 
21 judgment payment has to be paid to the court. 
22 Q. According to that court document 
23 then, if you don't bring him into the court by 
24 January 20 of 1999, then you have to pay the 
25 court money? 
1 • • • No 
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1 A. Right. 
2 Q. Why was that? 
3 A. The Rio Blanco court reviewed the 
4 case on January 20. At that date if no one from 
5 our office had appeared or we didn't have legal, 
6 you know, cause to - that judgment should not 
7 be entered, then that April date is the date that 
8 the court is saying have him in my courtroom by 
9 April or in custody, otherwise you're going to 
10 have to pay the judgment order. 
11 Q. Okay. And that date that he needed 
12 to be brought back to the court was April 20 of 
13 1999? 
14 A. That sounds correct, but I can't say 
15 with certainty without looking at the judgment 
\\6 order. 
17 Q. Okay. To your best recollection, was 
18 it April 20 of 1999? 
19 A. Yes, ma'am. 
20 Q. And if Mr. Lee were not brought back 
21 to court by that date, how much would you have 
22 to pay the court? 
23 A. The $500. 
24 Q. The notice of forfeiture, Exhibit 
25 D - or, excuse me, Exhibit 2, as you pointed 
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A. No, ma'am. 
Q. Okay. 
A. This is - this document says that 
I'm cited to appear on January 20 to show that -
why a judgment default should not be entered 
against me. If I fail to appear for the judgment 
hearing - for the default hearing to show 
cause, or I don't have legal cause that would 
persuade the court not to enter judgment, then 
the court enters judgment, and then there's a 
judgment due date. 
So there's going to be a notice of 
judgment similar to this document (indicating), 
and on that particular document it will have the 
judgment satisfaction date, and it's by that 
date that the defendant has to be remanded into 
custody or judgment has to be paid. 
Q. On January 20, 1999, did you or 
someone from A-l Bail Bonds go to the order to 
show cause? 
A. No, ma'am, not that I'm aware of. 
Q. For some reason the date got 
extended to April 20 of 1999 by which Mr. Lee 
needed to be brought into court by you or law 
enforcement? 
_ . 
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out, is addressed to several people, including 
you at A-l Bail Bonds. 
Did you receive a copy of this notice 
of forfeiture? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. When you received that notice, did 
you contact or try to contact Mr. Gerald Lee 
about having him come back for - to get him back 
into the custody of the court? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Okay. What I'm showing you as 
Exhibit 3 is a conversation log. 
(Exhibit 3 marked). 
BY MS. BLANCH: 
Q. This is something that you were kind 
enough to give me last week. 
MS. BLANCH: And we'll let Mr. 
Sanders take a look at it, because he 
hasn't seen it before. 
THE WITNESS: No, he doesn't have a 
copy of that. 
BY MS. BLANCH: 
Q. Can you tell us what Exhibit 3 is? 
A. Exhibit 3 is a conversation log that 
was in my computer database, that when I was 
_ . 
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trying to purge old letters or - out of the 
computer, 1 came across it, so I wasnft aware we 
had had that. 
Q. Okay. And when did you find it? 
A. Only like a couple of weeks ago when 
I started going through, because there's no space 
on my computer hard drive. 
Q. Did your ~ do you know when you 
created this conversation log? 
A. Well, it would have began on 2/23 of 
'99, because that would have been the first 
entry, and then I would have gone back on a 
regular basis to update it. 
Q. So there are several dates on the 
conversation log, all in - most of them in 
1999? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. One is in 2003. So you would have 
entered these various entries on the conversation 
log close to the time of the date? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Let's look at the first entry, 
which is February 23, 1999. It says, called C/S 
at his business, will call back tomorrow. 
Who is C/S? 
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A. That we called back the co-signer's 
place of business, and his wife answered, and 
that she was going to relay a message to her 
husband. 
Q. Mr. Montgomery? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. What is the date of the third 
entry? 
A. March 23 of'99. 
Q. What is the next entry? 
A. March 24 of'99. 
Q. What does that say? 
A. It said we called Gerald's mom, 
and she said that when she saw him, she would 
relay the message to him, that he needed to 
take care of the forfeiture and come back to 
Colorado, because we always try to discuss with 
people that ~ you know, come back voluntarily, 
do a book and release, it won't take that 
long, and then that way it's cleared up for 
everybody. 
Q. Okay. 
A. This should be April 1 of '99 
(indicating). 
Q. Okay. 
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A. Co-signer. 
Q. Okay. And that would be Mr. Wade 
Montgomery? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Let's look at the second 
entry, which is March 19,1999. What did you do 
on that date to try to get Mr. Lee back into 
court? 
A. Well, apparently there was no 
communication from the 23rd of February to 
March 19, so at that point we advised Mr. 
Montgomery of his contractual obligations, and 
told him that if Mr. Lee could not come back to 
Colorado or would not come back, then he would 
have to send us a $1,000 check to secure the 
liability. 
Q. What did he say to that? 
A. He said that he would try to get -
from what I can remember, was that he told us 
where — that Mr. Lee was staying at his 
brother's house, and as much as I - I can't 
remember details, other than - my inclination 
is that he was going to get ahold of Mr. Lee and 
have him get ahold of us. 
Q. What does the next entry say? 
_ . 
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A. I started erasing it without 
realizing what it was, and I went back in, and 
I guess my mind was 2003, not '99, so I 
apologize. 
Q. Okay. In case anyone is wondering 
where you got Mrs. Lee's phone number for ~ 
Gerald Lee's mother, on the bond application, 
which is Exhibit 1,1 notice that there is a 
phone number for a — it says mother, Mona Rae 
Lee, and then has her phone number? 
A. Right. 
Q. Is that how you got her phone number 
to call her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. To the best of my knowledge. I mean 
if her number has changed, we could have called 
information or done some, you know, minor 
investigation to find the new number. 
Q. Okay. And then the last entry, 
which is dated April 1, and you said 1999, what 
does that say? 
A. It says the co-signer called, and I 
had ~ I is myself, that I would be leaving to 
go to Utah to pick up Gerald and return him to 
_ 
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1 Colorado, and that he would be liable for those 
2 expenses. 
3 Q. Okay. On April 1 of 1999, did you 
4 have plans yourself to go to Grand Junction and 
5 pick him up? 
6 A, Yes, I had - - 1 do remember talking j 
I 7 to the co-signer and saying if you can't send me 
8 the $1,000, then we need to get him picked up and 
9 remanded back into custody. 
10 Q. What happened after that? 
II A. I didn't go to Utah right away, I 
12 just - because I didn't give the exact date to 
13 Mr. Montgomery. The next thing I know, the 
14 defendant was brought back by Miles Langley. I 
15 Q. Okay. Who is Miles Langley? | 
16 A. Miles Langley is a gentleman that j 
17 resides in Colorado, was doing bail recovery I 
18 for some bonding agencies. He was a bouncer at 
19 a bar. I mean Miles did, you know, odds and 
20 ends jobs. 
21 Q. Did Miles Langley hold himself out 
22 as a bail bondsman? I 
23 A. Not to m y knowledge. j 
24 Q. Okay. Had you ever - had A - l Bail 
25 Bonds ever worked before with Mr. Langley? j 
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1 working there, she had the forfeitures on her 
2 desk, and I don't know if she could have given 
3 him the forfeiture to go take care of or if he 
4 would have seen it on one of the desks. You 
5 know, we had a pawn shop at that location, so 
6 there were people in and out all the time. 
7 Q. Okay. Would it also have been 
8 possible for him to go to court and look through 
9 the documents and see that he needed to be 
10 brought back to Utah - or to Grand Junction, 
11 Colorado? 
12 A. Yeah. Miles was in and out of the 
13 courthouse a lot of times, so if he was at any 
14 of the hearings, he could have been there even 
15 at the time that the judge was ordering 
16 forfeiture on a particular case. 
117 Q. Now, when Mr. Langley came back to 
118 Grand Junction with Mr. Gerald Lee, did he come 
j 19 to A - l Bail Bonds? 
20 A. I wasn't there, so I don't know if he 
21 came to A - l Bail Bonds first or if he went to the 
22 jail first. I don't know. 
23 Q. Okay. N o w , some of your answer for 
24 this next question may be something that you 
25 learned from your husband, and if it is, please 
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1 A. No . 
2 Q. Had A - l Bail Bonds ever hired Mr. 
3 Langley to do anything for A - l Bail Bonds? 
4 A. NO. 
5 Q. Was Mr. Langley ever an employee of 
6 A - l Bail Bonds? 
7 A. No . 
8 Q. Did you or your husband hire Mr. 
9 Langley to apprehend Gerald Lee in Utah? 
10 A. No . 
11 Q. Did you ask him to apprehend Mr. Lee 
12 in Utah? 
13 A. No . 
14 Q. A s you came to find out, Mr. Langley 
15 apprehended Mr. Lee in Vernal, Utah, and brought 
16 him back to Colorado. 
17 D o you have any idea how Mr. Langley 
18 would have found out that there was a notice of 
19 forfeiture and that Gerald Lee needed to come 
20 back to Utah by April 20? 
21 A. Only by speculation. 
22 Q. What is your speculation? 
23 A. Miles regularly hung out at 
24 different bond offices, and he would go out and 
25 party with one of the subagents that we had 
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1 let us know that, so that w e know that it's 
2 something that your husband told us. 
3 Did Mr. Langley talk to your husband 
4 around April 3 of 1999 about paying him for 
5 apprehending Mr. Gerald Lee? 
6 A. Not to my knowledge. 
7 Q. Okay. When Mr. Langley came back 
8 with Mr. Gerald Lee to Colorado, did he take him 
9 straight to the courthouse? 
10 A. Well, he wouldn't have taken him to 
11 the courthouse, he would have taken him to the 
12 jai l . 
13 Q. Okay. To your knowledge, did that 
14 happen? 
15 A. Yes, he was taken to the jail. 
16 Q. Okay. And then how did A - l Bail 
17 Bonds find out about that; did the jail contact 
18 A - l Bail Bonds? 
19 A. N o , the j ail wouldn' t have contacted 
20 us. I don't know if Mr. Lee called Bob after he 
21 had been booked into the jail or if Miles came 
22 back. I don't know how they communicated that 
23 he was back in town. 
24 Q. Okay. But at some point A - l Bail 
25 Bonds learned that Mr. Lee was back in Colorado; 
* * * Notes * * * 
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1 is that right? 
2 A. That fs correct. 
3 Q. And that he was in jail? 
4 A. That's correct. 
5 Q. And at that point, because he was 
( 6 in jail, was it necessary for him to get a second 
I 7 bond? 
8 A. For his release, yes. Bob revoked 
9 the Mesa County bond, and then posted two bonds 
110 to secure his release on the new warrant 
II amounts. 
12 Q. So when Gerald Lee came back to 
13 Colorado on April 3 of 1999, the first bond 
14 that we've been talking about, the one dated 
15 November 30, 1998, was revoked; is that right? 
16 A. The Rio Blanco bond was never 
17 revoked at the Mesa County Detention Facility. 
18 The Mesa County bond was revoked at the Mesa 
19 County Detention Facility. To my knowledge, 
20 he was remanded into custody on the Rio Blanco 
21 warrant, as well as the Mesa County warrant. 
22 Q. The second bond is in the amount of 
23 $750, while the first one back in 1998 is in the 
24 amount of $500. 
25 Why was the second bond more? 
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1 A. As far as I can remember, we've only 
2 hired one person as an independent bail recovery 
3 agent, James Julianno out of New Mexico, to 
4 apprehend somebody that was out of state. 
5 Actually, there's twice. I had a 
6 Kelly - a defendant by the name of Kelly 
7 Bradbury that had fled on a plane, and she went 
8 to Arizona, and I contacted some bail agency 
9 in Arizona to meet her at the airport to 
10 detain her until I showed up and could bring her 
11 back. 
12 Q. Were there any bail agents or bail 
13 bondsmen that you hired inside of Colorado to 
14 apprehend someone inside of Colorado? 
15 A. No. 
[16 Q. Okay. In the bail bonding industry, 
17 is it typical for a company like A-l Bail Bonds, 
18 if they're going to hire an individual to go out 
19 and apprehend someone, just to hire them for a 
20 particular job? 
21 A. Can you say that again? 
22 Q. Sure. If someone like A-l Bail 
23 Bonds needs to hire a bail bondsman to apprehend 
24 an individual, is it typical in the industry 
25 for them to hire them just for that particular 
Page 4 • 
1 A. The judges usually elevate the 
2 amount that is required to - for their release. 
3 Obviously a $500 secured bond wasn't enough to 
4 warrant Mr. Lee to come back and take care of 
5 his court obligations, so by increasing that 
6 amount, the courts are trying to provide an 
7 additional incentive, financial incentive, that 
8 they'll return. 
9 Q. Okay. Does A-l have any bail - or 
10 did A-l have any bail bondsmen as employees? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Were they independent contractors? 
13 A. They're what's called subagents. 
14 Q. It sounds like there were times when 
15 someone got a bond with A-l Bail Bonds, they 
16 failed to appear, and you needed to go apprehend 
17 them. 
18 Sometimes it sounds like you would 
19 do it; is that right? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Would your husband ever do it? 
22 A. Sometimes. 
23 • Q. And then sometimes you would hire 
24 these independent contractor bail bondsmen to do 
25 it? 
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1 job? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. When you used Mr. Julianno as an 
4 independent contractor bail bondsman, how did 
5 you pay him, how did you reimburse him for 
6 apprehending the individual? 
7 A. By check. 
8 Q. Do you understand that Mr. Langley 
9 has testified before in this case, he's given 
10 a deposition just like you have in this case? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. It' s my understanding that he 
13 passed away. Do you know whether he has either 
14 way? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Mr. Langley said in his deposition 
17 that your husband, Robert Thorpe, paid him money 
18 to go get Mr. Lee in Vernal, Utah. 
19 Is that true, to your knowledge? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Have you looked through bank 
22 statements and cancelled checks from A-l Bail 
23 Bonds in April and May of 1999 just to verify 
24 that no check was ever given by A-l Bail Bonds 
25 to Mr. Langley? 
* * * "Nfotp i^ 
*** Notes *** 
Page 46 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. What have you found? 
3 A. There was no such payment. 
4 Q. Okay. Go ahead. 
5 A. There was also Gerald and Sherry 
6 Green that we've used for recovery, but like I 
7 said, those are just on a limited basis. And we 
8 would hire some out-of-state people to find 
9 people that are out of state to minimize our 
10 costs, because we donft know the areas, and it 
11 just takes a lot of time. 
12 Q. And have you paid all of those 
13 individuals with a check? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 MS. BLANCH: Let's mark as Exhibit 4 
16 what I've put in front of our court 
17 reporter. 
18 (Exhibit 4 marked). 
19 BY MS. BLANCH: 
20 Q. This is something that you sent to me 
21 last week; is that right? 
22 A. Yes, ma'am. 
23 Q. Okay. As Mr. Sanders is looking it 
24 over, because he hasn't seen this yet, could you 
25 tell us what Exhibit 4 is? 
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I l cancelled checks? 
2 A. Absolutely. 
3 Q. But you can tell us now that after 
4 looking at your bank statements and the cancelled 
5 checks, there were no checks made out to Miles 
6 Langley? 
7 A. No, ma'am. 
8 Q. We have been talking about two 
9 bonds, one is November 30, 1998, and then there 
10 was a second one. I don't know if you've 
II brought that with you. 
12 A. I think both bonds were originally 
13 written on the same date, and then when he was 
14 re-incarcerated, both bonds would be posted on 
15 the same date, to the best of my knowledge. 
16 Q. Okay. The second bond would have 
17 been dated around April 3 of 1999, wouldn't it 
18 have? 
19 A. Yes, ma'am. April 30 maybe. April 3 
20 or April 30, I'm sorry. 
21 Q. Okay. Between the time that you 
22 learned -
23 A. April 3. 
24 Q. Okay. April 3? 
25 A. Yes, ma'am. 
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1 A. It's bank statements for our business 
2 account, for A-l Bail Bonds. 
3 Q. From what time period? 
4 A. I believe from the end of March 
5 until maybe May or June. 
6 Q. Okay. And why did--
7 A. Prior to the date of his recovery, 
8 and then a month or more after that time. 
9 Q. Why did you get those bank 
10 statements? 
11 A. To look to see if a payment had, in 
12 fact, been made. You know, just to clarify, so 
13 that I could make exact responses today. Even 
14 though I had no knowledge of any payment, I 
15 just wanted to double-check for my own peace of 
16 mind. 
17 Q. And you've also brought cancelled 
18 checks with you, I noticed? 
19 A. Yes, ma'am, so that if there's any 
20 misunderstanding about any amount that appears 
21 on there, that the actual check can be viewed to 
22 see to whom it was endorsed and where it was 
23 cashed and the date it was issued. 
24 Q. Okay. If Mr. Sanders wishes during a 
25 break, will he be able to look through those 
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1 Q. So one is dated November 30, '98, the 
2 other is dated April 3 of '99? 
3 A. That's correct. 
4 Q. Between the time that you learned 
5 that Miles Langley had apprehended Gerald Lee 
6 and brought him back to Colorado and the time 
7 you issued the second bond on April 3 of 1999, 
8 did you or anyone at A-l Bail Bonds tell Ranger 
9 that Mr. Langley had apprehended Mr. Lee? 
10 A. I don't believe so, no. 
11 Q. Did you or anyone else at A-l Bail 
12 Bonds tell Ranger about the circumstances of 
13 how Mr. Langley had apprehended Mr. Lee? 
14 A. I don't believe so. 
15 Q. Okay. To your knowledge, would 
16 Ranger have had any way of knowing that there 
17 was a scuffle between Mr. Langley and the Lee 
18 brothers during the apprehension? 
19 A. Not by our agency, no. 
20 (Exhibit 5 marked). 
21 BY MS. BLANCH: 
22 Q. What we've marked as Exhibit 5 is a 
23 copy of the bail bond underwriting agreement 
24 between Ranger and A-l Bail Bonds. 
25 MS. BLANCH: And I don't know 
* * * MntpQ * * * 
* * * ^^V\f/*c * * * 
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1 whether Mr. Sanders has ever seen this. 
2 Have you? 
3 MR. SANDERS: Is it this? 
4 MS. BLANCH: Yes. It appears that 
5 he does. 
6 BY MS. BLANCH: 
7 Q. Is what has been marked as Exhibit 5 
8 the contract between A-1 Bail Bonds and Ranger 
9 Insurance that was in place in 1999? 
10 A. Yes, ma'am. 
11 Q. I wanted to direct your attention to 
12 paragraph 3, where it says relation of company, 
13 general agent and agent. 
14 Is the company Ranger? 
15 A. I'm not sure, because this contract 
16 was provided to us by NABBS, North American Bail j 
17 Bonds. They were our general agents. They're a 
18 company that was between ourselves and Ranger. 
19 So NABBS contracted with Ranger, I contracted 
20 with NABBS. 
21 Q. Okay. So just like when I -
22 okay. When I get automobile policies for m y 
23 automobiles, I go to m y agent, I don't go 
j 24 directly to the insurance company? 
25 A. That's correct. 
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1 agent is A-1 Bail Bonds, is that of principal and 
2 independent contractor. 
3 Was that your understanding? 
4 A. W e l l -
5 Q. So you were sort of an independent 
6 contractor vis-a-vis Ranger? 
7 A. That's correct. 
8 Q. Okay. Then it says, agent shall 
9 have exclusive control over his retail bail 
10 business, shall set his or her own working 
11 hours, and shall retain or discharge employees 
12 or independent contractors in agent's sole 
13 discretion. 
14 And the way that the relationship 
15 worked between Ranger and A-1 Bail Bonds, was 
16 that true, you had control over all -
17 A. That's true. 
18 Q. - details of your business? 
19 A. Yes, ma'am. 
20 Q. A little further down in the 
21 paragraph it says, agent is solely responsible 
22 for seeking out and obtaining any and all 
23 specialized knowledge and skills necessary in 
24 his or her professional function, and is 
25 similarly solely responsible for the proper | 
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1 Q. Okay. 
2 A. I did not sign this contract in 
3 front of Ranger, you know, with Ranger, I - it 
4 was a - I was being appointed by North 
5 American Bail Bonds to write for Ranger, and then 
I 6 North American Bail Bonds had a contract with 
7 Ranger. 
8 Q. If w e look at the very first 
, 9 paragraph of the underwriting agreement, the 
110 contract between A-1 and Ranger, it may clarify 
|11 this. 
12 It says, this agreement is entered 
13 into the 11th of March, 1998, by and between 
14 Ranger Insurance Company, and there are some 
15 more words there, then A-1 Bail Bonds, 
16 hereinafter general agent, and Robert Paul Thorpe 
17 and Maria Elizabeth Thorpe, A-1 Bail Bonds, 
18 hereinafter agent or -
19 A. See, here, this clarifies. 
20 Hereinafter RIC or company is referring to 
21 Ranger. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 A. So that's correct. 
24 Q. Okay. So if we look at paragraph 3 , 
25 it says, the relation of company and agent, and 
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1 screening, selection and hiring of all employees 
2 and/or independent contractors retained by 
3 agent. 
4 And is that the way the relationship 
5 worked between you and Ranger? 
6 A. That's correct. 
7 Q. Okay. So if you wanted to go out 
8 and apprehend someone, you were the one with 
9 the skills and knowledge necessary to do that? 
10 A. And the authority. 
11 Q. Okay. So that's not something that 
12 Ranger could dictate to you how to do it, 
13 because that wouldn't have been practical? 
14 A. They never did. There was never any 
15 communication. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. There was never any exception 
18 either. 
19 Q. And then if we look at paragraph 8 
20 of the agreement, which is found on page 3, it 
21 says, agent duties with regard to bond 
22 principals. Agent shall be solely responsible 
23 for the negotiating, underwriting, securing and 
24 posting of bail bonds issued to secure the 
25 release from custody of criminal defendants, 
* * * Notes * * * 
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